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Abstract
Wilfrid Sellars is widely known for two positions that he calls “nominalism.”
On the one hand, there is his “psychological nominalism,” according to which any
awareness one might have of abstract entities—be they properties, relations, or
facts—is a thoroughly linguistic affair, and so cannot be presupposed in thinking
about the process of learning a (first) language. On the other hand, there is
his ontological nominalism, according to which the world, as it is in itself, is
fundamentally a world of concrete particulars and so does not ultimately contain
such things as properties, relations, or propositionally-structured facts. Sellars
clearly takes these two sorts of ”nominalism” to go together. However, one of the
most influential inheritors of Sellars’s philosophy, Robert Brandom, thinks that
they do not. Brandom endorses the former, but denies that the latter ”is in the
end so much as intelligible.” In this paper, I articulate the connection between
Sellars’s psychological and ontological nominalism and draw on Brandom’s own
development of Sellars’s functional role semantics to argue, against Brandom,
that Sellars’s ontological nominalism not only harmonizes with the rest of his
philosophical commitments, but is actually made fully intelligible by the very
aspect of Sellars’s theory that Brandom himself develops.
0 Introduction
Wilfrid Sellars is widely known for two positions that he calls “nominalism.” On
the one hand, there is his idiosyncratically-dubbed “psychological nominalism,” his
view that any awareness one might have of abstract entities—be they properties,
relations, or facts—is a thoroughly linguistic affair, to be understood in terms of one’s
mastery of the functional roles of corresponding linguistic expressions, and so cannot
be presupposed in thinking about the process of learning a (first) language (1956;
1963b).1 On the other hand, there is his “nominalism” in the more familiar sense of
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the term, his ontological nominalism, according to which the world, as it is in itself,
is fundamentally a world of concrete particulars and so does not ultimately contain
such things as properties, relations, or propositionally-structured facts (1968; 1979,
41). Sellars clearly takes these two sorts of “nominalism” to go together. However,
it is not clear just how they do, and one of the most influential inheritors of Sellars’s
philosophy, Robert Brandom, thinks that they do not.2 Brandom takes himself to be
a staunch proponent of Sellars’s psychological nominalism, but he is nevertheless a
staunch opponent of his ontological nominalism, endorsing an ontology according to
which the world is a world of propositionally-structured facts, consisting in objects
being propertied and related in various ways, and explicitly doubting whether Sellars’s
ontological nominalism “is in the end so much as intelligible,” (2015, 270). In this paper,
I articulate the connection between Sellars’s psychological and ontological nominalism
and draw on Brandom’s own development of Sellars’s functional role semantics to
argue, against Brandom, that Sellars’s ontological nominalism not only harmonizes
with the rest of his philosophical commitments, but is actually made fully intelligible
by the very aspect of Sellars’s theory that Brandom himself develops.
Here’s the plan. In Section One, I lay out the basic framework in which Sellars’s
two “nominalism”s are to be placed. The key to making sense of Sellars’s overarching
nominalistic picture, I claim, is, perhaps surprisingly, making sense of his (capital “p”)
Platonism, specifically, his distinction between “two worlds,” the world of concep-
tual contents, understood metaphorically as “shadows” cast by our practice of using
language, and the world of reality, to which that practice casting the shadows really
belongs. This general picture only comes into view through a consideration of his psy-
chological nominalism, and it is within the context of this picture that his ontological
nominalism is to be placed. In the subsequent sections, I spell out the details of this
picture. In Section Two, I lay out the inversion of the platonist conception of meaning,
made available by his functional role semantics, that constitutes his “psychological
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nominalism,” showing how Sellars manages to spell it out in such a way that it is com-
patible with ontological nominalism. In Section Three, I draw on Brandom’s theory of
properties as modal correspondents to normatively-articulated functional roles to non-
metaphorically spell out Sellars’s “two worlds” picture, according to which properties
are “shadows” of the norms governing the use of predicates. In Section Four, I criticize
Brandom as falling prey to a version of the “Myth of the Given,” taking knowledge of
the categorial structure of the world to come for free, just by learning a language with
a certain syntactic structure, thus mistaking the “shadows” cast by a linguistic practice
for the reality to which the practice responsible for casting the shadows belongs. It
is this possible divergence between the categorial structure of reality and the logical
structure of our language that opens the door for Sellars’s ontological nominalism,
and, in Sections Five and Six, I respond to Brandom’s two main challenges to Sellars’s
nominalism, the first semantic and the second ontological, to show how Sellars really
is able to coherently walk through it. In response to Brandom’s semantic challenge, I
show how Sellars’s functional role semantics, developed by Brandom, enables him to
think of the meanings of assertions entirely in terms of what one does in making those
assertions amounts to, without appealing to any abstract contents one says. In re-
sponse to Brandom’s ontological challenge, I show how Sellars’s late process ontology
enables him to think of the world, as it is in itself, as a world solely of particulars—not
particular things, but particular happenings, some of which are identifiable as the very
doings that account for the appearence of the “world” of conceptual contents. The
result is a nominalist picture with a systematic unity to which no other philosopher
can lay claim.
1 Sellars’s Platonic Nominalism
Ontological nominalism is the claim that the world, as it is in itself, consists solely
of concrete particulars, and so does not contain such things as properties or re-
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lations, which are both abstract and general, or, consequently, propositions and
propositionally-structured facts, at least insofar as such things depend for their ex-
istence on such things as properties or relations.3 Wilfrid Sellars has done as much
work as anyone in twentieth century philosophy to make good on the nominalist
thesis. Despite this, and despite his philosophical stature, his work does not have
a significant place in contemporary discussions of platonism and nominalism.4 In-
deed, it is not even recognized as a possibility in the vast majority of contemporary
discussions. It is not hard to see why this is so. The view simply doesn’t fit into
contemporary discussions. In an almost literal sense, it’s too big. The most notable
thing about Sellars’s distinctive brand of nominalism in this regard is that it actually
contains the platonist picture of reality as a proper part. According to Sellars, there are
properties and relations, and properties and relations are pretty much as the platon-
ist takes them to be: abstract general things that particular things might instantiate.
However, while the platonist is superficially correct in that there are properties and
relations, the nominalist is ultimately correct in that there are really no properties and
relations (1979, 41). It is this pair of claims, which may seem contradictory at first
blush, that must be understood in order to make sense of Sellars’s nominalistic vision.
The key to understanding how these claims can fit together, I take it, is understanding
Sellars’s overarching (capital “p”) Platonic picture.
Sellars’s (capital “p”) Platonic picture can be understood as proceeding from an
internal critique of (lower-case “p”) platonism. The critique, in Sellars’s (1956) terms,
is that platonism almost always essentially involves an instance of the Myth of the
Given. According to Sellars, platonism generally contains, at its core, the psychologi-
cal thesis “that the phenomena of meaning (aboutness or reference) involves some sort
of commerce (usually spoken of in terms of ‘intuition,’ ‘apprehension’ or ‘awareness’)
between persons and abstract entities,” (1963b, 442). For instance, on the platonist
picture, knowing the meaning of “red” involves, as a precondition, awareness of the
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property of being red, since learning the meaning of “red,” on the platonist psycholog-
ical picture, is coming to know that the word “red” stands for this property. The basic
epistemological question that the platonist faces is how to make sense of the “aware-
ness” of abstract entities that we are supposed to have independently our knowledge
of the meanings of linguistic expressions. This awareness is imagined by platonists to
be simple and straightforward, but it is rarely noted just how much has to come by
way of it. For instance, it seems that, if one knows what it is for something to be red,
then one must know at least some such things as that something’s being red implies
that it’s colored, is incompatible with its being green, and so on. This knowledge of
the metaphysical structure of the space of properties to which the property of being
red belongs, it seems, must be simply given through the mere awareness of the prop-
erty of being red. Furthermore, it seems that knowing what it is for something to be
red involves knowing such things as that something’s being red is its instantiating
a general property, something that other objects might instantiate, that its instantiat-
ing this property constitutes a fact, one which makes true the proposition that it is
red, and several other facts about “categorial structure” to which properties belong,
existing among other categorial notions such as objects, facts, and propositions. So,
the platonist takes it that, through the mere awareness of properties, the metaphysical
and categorial structure of the world “imposes itself on the mind as a seal imposes an
image on melted wax,” (1981a, 12). That, according to Sellars, is “perhaps the most
basic form” (1981a, 11) of the Myth of the Given.5
Now, there is significant debate in the secondary literature about what, exactly,
the Myth of the Given is. I take it, however, that Sellars’s term actually functions
as a perfectly sufficient description of what it picks out. The Myth of the Given, in
general terms, is simply any conception of knowledge of some aspect of reality as
simply given to us, and intelligible only as given in this way.6 The basic problem with
any instance of the Myth is that, by thinking of knowledge of some aspect of reality
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as given, we preclude ourselves from thinking of what we hold of reality in having
this knowledge as something that we hold rationally. Holding something rationally
requires being able, at least in principle, to put it in to question and, in response to
that question, articulate the reasons for holding it.7 If something is taken to be simply
given, and intelligible only as such, then knowledge of it constitutes a stopping point
in the inquiry into our knowledge of reality, at which no questions can be asked.
But if no questions can be asked, then no reasons can be given, and so we cannot
make sense of our knowledge of what is given as rational. Accordingly, we cannot
make sense of this supposedly given “knowledge” as genuinely knowledge. In other
words, conceiving of knowledge of some aspect of reality as given undermines its
very status as knowledge. Applying this general point to the particular instance of
the Myth that concerns us here, any form of platonism involving the psychological
thesis stated above is going to preclude us from being able to make sense of our
knowledge of the metaphysical or the categorial structure to which properties belong
as rational, and thus, as genuinely knowledge. Recognizing this issue, the move
Sellars makes, following Carnap, is to invert the platonist order of explanation, taking
our awareness of properties and relations to be underlain by our knowledge of the
meanings of predicates, rather than the other way around. On this inverted picture,
properties and relations are conceived of as “shadows” of the rules governing the
use of predicates. Awareness of these entities is really nothing other than reified
awareness of the rules governing the use of predicates, and so we can give an account
of knowledge of them not as given but as achieved through language learning.8 Sellars
thereby arrives at the opposing thesis of psychological nominalism, that “all awareness
of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc. [. . . ] is a linguistic affair,” (1956, 63).
Insofar as one takes the order of explanation to go in the direction that Sellars does,
taking it that “ontological categories are the shadows, so to speak, of syntactical dis-
tinctions” (1963b, 256), one may well take it that there is a “world” of propositionally-
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structured facts, which are about objects that are propertied and related in various
ways. It is just that this world is a shadow cast by the practice of using a language with
the syntactic categories of sentences, singular terms, and 1- and n-place predicates.
Insofar as we think of this world containing propositions, properties, and relations
as but a shadow cast by the practice of using a language containing sentences and
predicates, we do not have any positive reason to think that the reality to which the
practice casting the shadow belongs is itself correctly categorized by the ontological
framework that correctly categorizes the shadow it casts. This is not itself a reason to
reject the claim that this categorial framework correctly categorizes the world, as it is
in itself, independently of our practices of thinking and speaking, but it is a reason to
be prima facie critical of the claim. To uncritically take the reality to which the practice
responsible for casting the shadows belongs to be of the same categorial structure as
the shadows it casts would be a mistake, indeed, an instance of the Myth of the Given.
Sellars’s nominalism is thus, to milk the metaphor of shadows for all it’s worth, a Pla-
tonic nominalism.9 The platonist, ironically enough, is in the position of the prisoner
in Plato’s cave, who is aware of a world of appearances, of shadows, but mistakes that
world for the real world underlying these appearances, to which the reality casting
the shadows belongs.
That, in broad strokes, is the basic picture in which Sellars’s ontological nominalism
is to be placed. Ontological nominalism comes in as a way of characterizing reality
only once psychological nominalism has brought into view the Platonic distinction
between the world of appearance, understood as the world of conceptual contents
conferred by our linguistic practice, and the world of reality, to which our linguistic
practice really belongs. So, the view is at least cursorily intelligible. Still, does it
actually work? Is there a well-oiled machine under these suggestive metaphors? I
want to claim that there is. Let me turn to the details of the view in order to do just
that.
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2 Psychological Nominalism, Nominalistically Construed
Let us start with Sellars’s reaction to psychological platonism, the inversion of the
order of explanation in the platonist conception of meaning that constitutes his “psy-
chological nominalism.” Recall, the psychological platonist supposes that, prior to
learning a language, one becomes acquainted with not only concrete objects, but also
abstract objects, and, in particular, the properties and relations instantiated by the
objects with which one is acquainted. It is this psychological thesis that underlies the
apparent explanatory fruitfulness of what Sellars calls “relational theories” of mean-
ing.10 According to a relational theory of meaning, statements like the following:
1. The German word “rot” means red.
state that a relation of signifying or standing for, expressed by “means,” obtains between
a linguistic entity, the German word “rot,” and an abstract entity, the property of being
red. Thus, on a relational theory of meaning, (1) is analyzed as follows:
1a. The German word “rot” stands for the property of being red.
This relational analysis of (1) as (1a) is only theoretically illuminating insofar as it con-
stitutes part of an “Augustinian” explanation of semantic competence (Wittgenstein
1953), according which learning a language is learning to match up words, be they
names or predicates, with the entities in the world, be they concrete or abstract, that
these words conventionally stand for.11 It thus involves a commitment to psycho-
logical platonism, whereby speakers have cognitive access to abstract entities such as
properties and relations independently of their grasp of the meanings of predicates
that can be appealed to in order to explain their grasp of these meanings. That, as we’ve
explicated above, is an instance of the Myth of the Given. Psychological nominalism,
as we’ve said, is a way of rejecting the Myth by inverting the psychological platonist
order of explanation, thinking of knowledge of abstract entities as not underlying but,
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rather, underlain by knowledge of the meanings of linguistic expressions.
If one wishes to be a psychological nominalist, thinking of knowledge of abstract
entities as underlain by knowledge of the meanings of linguistic expressions, one
cannot, on pain of circularity, think of the meanings of linguistic expressions in terms of
relations that these expressions stand to abstract entities. So, one must reject a relational
analysis of “means” statements in one’s account of semantic knowledge, supplanting
it with an alternate conception of what is expressed by “means” statements such as
(1). On Sellars’s alternative proposal, intended to supplant the relational analysis, in
uttering (1), rather than relating the German word “rot” to an entity picked out with a
special sort of referential use of the English word “red,” the property of being red, we
are functionally characterizing the German word “rot” with a special sort of predicative
use of the English word “red,” characterizing the German word “rot” as an expression
that plays the functional role in German that “red” plays in English.12 That is the basic
way of thinking about meaning that enables the psychological nominalist inversion.
To spell it out in a way that is compatible with ultimately endorsing ontological
nominalism, Sellars has to make several moves in order to show how we can classify
words as playing functional roles without appealing to properties in terms of which
these words or their functional roles are identified or relations that these words are
taken to stand in to their functional roles, showing that, strictly speaking, any talk of
properties or relations is dispensable in this theory of “means” statements.
First, to make sense of the use of the phrase “the German word ‘rot,”’ which
appears in the left half of (1), without taking it to be referring to the conjunction of
properties that all inscriptions of “rot” instantiate, Sellars (1963, 630-633) analyzes the
phrase “the word ‘rot”’ as a distributive singular term, thus reconstructing (1) as:
1b. “rot”s in German mean red.
Here, on the left side, reference is just made to “rot”s, particular inscriptions in German
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text.13 So, we can make sense of (1) as a statement about particulars, specifically,
German “rot”s. What we’re saying about these particulars, on Sellars’s analysis, is
that they play, in German, the role that “red”s play in English.14 To now classify
particular inscriptions as playing these “roles” without referring to the properties
that all the inscriptions that play that role have in common, Sellars introduces the
convention of dot-quoting (1963a, 1979). Using a language L, one can dot-quote an
expression e to form a sortal term •e• that applies to an expression e′ belonging to
a language L′ just in case e′ plays the same functional role in L′ as e plays in L.
So, speaking English, one can form the expression •red•, which is a sortal term that
applies to English “red”s by definition, but also German “rot”s, Spanish “rojo”s, and
any other expressions that play the same functional role in their language as “red”s
play in English.15 Having introduced the convention of dot-quoting, Sellars is able to
provide the following analysis of (1b):
1c. “rot”s in German are •red•s.
Crucially, on this analysis, the word “means” in (1) is analyzed not as expressing a
relation, but, rather, as a specialized form of the copula (Sellars 1974, 431; 1979, 81).
Accordingly, the use of “red” in (1) is understood as a predicative use, functioning
to directly classify “rot”s, rather than a referential use, functioning to pick out some
property to which “rot”s all stand in the meaning relation. Indeed, on this analysis,
where “means” is construed as a specialized form of the copula, there is no meaning
relation expressed in (1): there is just the functional classification of “rot”s as •red•s.
Of course, all of this is for naught if being a •red• just is being an expression that
functions to ascribe the property of being red to things. Sellars is thus compelled to
give an account of what it is for something to be a •red• that does not in any way make
reference to the property of being red. This is just what the functional role semantics
proposed by Sellars (1954), and developed by Brandom (1994, 2001), enables us to do.
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As Brandom spells out functional role semantics, we start with sentential roles, since
the utterance of a declarative sentence is the minimal move that can be made in a
language game, entitling, committing, or precluding one from being entitled to make
other moves (See Brandom 1994, 141-198; 2001, 12-15). So, for instance, in making
the move that one makes in uttering an “a is red,” where “a” is some singular term of
English, one commits oneself to making the move that one makes in uttering an “a is
colored,” precludes oneself from being entitled to make the move that one makes in
uttering an “a is green,” and so on.16 To arrive at the roles of predicates, we isolate the
element of those sentential roles that stays constant as we substitute different singular
terms into the sentences that play them. So, we notice that, if we take the utterance
of another singular term, say “b,” and substitute it for the utterance of “a” in any of
these utterances, the normative relations between the moves made by the utterances
are preserved. Thus, we can characterize utterances of “a is red”s and “b is red”s, as
both •red•(x)s for some singular term x, and we can say that, for any singular term x,
commitment to the move one makes in uttering a •red•(x) commits one to the move
one makes in uttering a •colored•(x), precludes one from being entitled to the move
one makes in uttering a •green•(x), and so on.17
We can now construe sentences which appear to articulate alethic modal rela-
tions between properties as covert expressions of the norms governing the use of
functionally-characterized predicates. For instance
2. The property of being red is incompatible with the property of being
green.
is construed as an expression of the norms governing the use of •red•s and •green•s:
for any singular term x of any language L containing such predicates, •red•(x)s are
incompatible with •green•(x)s.18 Spelling out this normative notion of incompatibility
in Brandomian terms, this is to say that commitment to the utterance of a •red•(x)
precludes one from being entitled to the utterance of a •green•(x). Sellars takes it
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that sentences like (2), which involve talk of properties, play an important meta-
linguistic expressive role, enabling us to express the norms governing the correct use
of predicates and sentences.19 However, he maintains that the role that this talk
plays is not ultimately a descriptive one. Ultimately, in uttering sentences like (2),
we are not articulating the modal relations that obtain between properties, but, rather,
expressing semantic norms governing the use of functionally-characterized predicates.
In uttering (2), one is expressing a normative attitude that one takes with respect
to two acts, specifically, on the Brandomian analysis, an attitude of scoring anyone
committed to the utterance of a •red•(x) to be precluded from being entitled to the
utterance of a •green•(x). Such expressions function, ultimately, not to describe reality,
but to regiment the language such that speakers’ utterances of •red•(x)s, as a matter
of dispositional fact, exclude their utterance of a •green•(x). Widespread conformity
to and convergence in normative attitudes brings with it widespread agreement on
sentences like (2), but this agreement is ultimately agreement in the scorekeeping
habits reinforced by utterances of (2), not agreement on the truth of a proposition
expressed by (2), since ultimately, on Sellars’s picture, there is no such thing.20
3 Supplementing the Sellarsian Story
The above story is, while surely not the whole of the Sellarsian story, as much as Sellars
explicitly gives us as far as a theory of properties in terms of functionally-characterized
predicates. While I think it puts us on the right path, I don’t think it’s quite enough
for an adequate account of properties. What is lacking is the resources to make
sense of the apparently descriptive role that talk of properties plays, and, as Sellars
himself says, “appearances are what give point to life—even for the philosopher,”
(1979, 7). Regardless of what the ultimate matter of reality is, (2) really does seem
to state that a modal relation obtains between the property of being red and the
property of being green; these properties are incompatible, in the sense something’s
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instantiating the property of being red makes it impossible for it to simultaneously
instantiate the property of being green. There is, it seems, a “world” to which these
properties belong, in which they are related, and this world, it seems can be described
with alethic modal vocabulary. Even if we want to deny this world’s ultimate reality,
we must nevertheless affirm its apparent reality in spelling out the Sellarsian picture.
Brandom (2019), I believe, in his recent work on Hegel, gives us the resources to make
sense of the apparently descriptive role of sentences like (2), enabling us to fill out the
details of the world of appearances in Sellars’s Platonic picture.
Brandom’s account of properties starts with a distinction between what we’re do-
ing, in applying a predicate to some object, and what we’re saying of that object in
doing so, between the pragmatic characterization of the act of applying a predicate to
an object and the semantic characterization of the content of such an act. According to
Brandom, what we’re doing, in uttering a •red•(x), for some singular term x, is making
a particular sort of move in the language game, one that commits us to uttering a
•colored•(x), precludes us from being entitled to utter a •green•(x), and so on. How-
ever, what we’re saying, in uttering a •red•(x), for some singular term x, is something
about the object that we’re speaking of in uttering x; we’re saying of this object that it
has the property of being red, a property such that, if some object instantiates it, then,
necessarily, it instantiates the property of being colored, it cannot possibly instantiate
the property of being green, and so on. Here, we have an holistic correspondence be-
tween the normative relations of implication and incompatibility that obtain between
our acts of applying predicates to objects and the alethic modal relations of implication
and incompatibility that obtain between the properties that are the contents of these
acts. Properties are alethically-articulated contents, sayables, which correspond, in
context of this holistic correspondence, to normatively-articulated acts, doables. Bran-
dom takes it that only by making this distinction between the aletheically-articulated
contents of our predicates and the normatively-articulated acts applying these predi-
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cates can we make sense of what we’re doing in performing predicative acts: ascribing
properties to objects, thus representing them as being certain ways, and thus saying
things that are either true or false, depending on how the things are.
This conception of the relation between what we’re doing with the use of a vocab-
ulary and what we’re saying with that use can be extended to the use of conditional
and modal vocabulary. For both Sellars and Brandom, in using modalized conditional
expressions, one is expressing the norms governing the use of predicates. However,
for Brandom, one is also articulating real relations between the properties expressed
by those predicates. When one says, for instance, “If something’s red, then it can’t
be green,” what one is doing is expressing the normative incompatibility of acts of us-
ing •red•s and •green•s, expressing the principle of scoring anyone committed to a
•red•(x) to be precluded from being entitled to a •green•(x). However, what one is
saying is that the property of being red is alethically incompatible with the property
of being green; that something’s instantiating the first property makes it impossible
for it to instantiate the second. Brandom’s way of drawing the distinction between
doing and saying here gives us a clear way of maintaining both modal expressivism
and modal realism, expressivism at the level of doing and realism at the level of saying
(Brandom 2015b, 174-215). In making a statement such as “If something’s red, then
it can’t be green,” one is expressing a rule governing the acts of applying •red•s and
•green•s, but one is also articulating a real relation between the contents of •red•s and
•green•s, between the property of being red an the property of being green. So, by
Brandom’s lights, we can have our expressivist cake and eat our realist one too. Now,
Sellars, unlike Brandom, is not ultimately going to want to eat the realist cake; he is not
ultimately a realist about the “world” of properties.21 Nevertheless, he is surely going
to want to have a taste of the realist cake, if only to spit it out, since he must admit
the apparent reality of the world of properties as constituting a crucial aspect of “the
manifest image,” (1962). Brandom’s theory of properties as alethic correspondents to
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the norms governing the use of predicates provides the Sellarsian story with just the
account of properties it needs here.
I take it that having made this Brandomian move, we gain a decisive advantage
over Sellars’s own officially stated theory of properties, enabling a fuller achievement
of the aim of the theory, which is helpfully characterized by Robert Kraut (2010) as
follows:
[Sellars] construes universals, propositions, and other “metaphysical” con-
structions as reifications of conceptual norms [. . . ] On Sellars’s view,
abstract entities and relations among them provide no grounds for nor-
mativity; such entities are, rather, shadows cast by the norms themselves,
(61).
I think this is indeed the view of abstract entities that Sellars is aiming at, but I do
not think that he ever develops the resources required to cash out this metaphor of
“shadows.” A crucial feature of the metaphor at play here is that shadows are not
identical to the things that cast them; they correspond in structure to these things, but
they are not the same. Sellars, however, ends up endorsing the claim that properties
just are functional roles of linguistic expressions. He tells us that abstract singular
terms such as “redness” or “the property of being red,” are “names of these roles,”
(1962, 37).22 But this just seems false. The property of being red, it seems, is not identical
to the functional role of English “red”s. Rather, it corresponds to this role. There is a
crucial difference between the functional role of English “red”s and the property of
objects such that, if they instantiate it, an expression that plays this role is correctly
applied to them. Brandom gives us a way of articulating this difference. The functional
role of a predicate is normatively articulated, whereas the corresponding property is
alethically articulated. The claim that the metaphysical entities are “shadows” of the
norms governing the use of corresponding linguistic ones now becomes the thesis that
the ontological entities are alethic reifications of the norms governing the use of their
linguistic counterparts. In just this sense, properties are the “shadows” of the norms
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governing the use of predicates.
4 Avoiding the Myth of the Categorially Given
Let us note now that, though we have concerned ourselves so far with the way in which
the alethically-articulated semantic contents of particular predicates and sentences—
particular properties, relations, and propositions—are shadows cast by the norms
governing the use of those predicates and sentences, this claim applies just as well to
the whole framework of properties, relations, and propositions, and so on. On Sellars’s
psychological nominalist picture, one comes to be aware of the world as a “struc-
tured logical space,” consisting in objects instantiating properties and standing in
relations, only through one’s induction into a linguistic practice, (1956, 65-66).23 The
categorial notions of “objects,” “properties,” “relations,” and “propositions” are to
be understood through the functional roles of their linguistic counterparts, singular
terms, 1-place adjectival predicates, n-place relational predicates, and sentences. It is
through mastering the use of expressions of these syntactic types—practically under-
standing their logically distinct functional roles—that one comes to have a grip on the
ontological categories of objects, properties, relations, and propositions. It is in this
sense that “ontological categories are the shadows, so to speak, of syntactical distinc-
tions,” (1963b, 256).24 We can now pose the following question: do these ontological
categories on which we’ve come to have a grip through learning the sort of language
that we’ve learned, which carve the world of conceptual contents conferred by our
language at its categorial joints, carve the world, as it is in itself, at its categorial joints?
To immediately answer the above question affirmatively—to think, in absence of
an argument, that the world, as it is in itself, simply must be ontologically categorized
in a way that corresponds to the way our language is syntactically categorized—would
be to fall prey to a form of the Myth of the Given. It would be to take knowledge of the
categorial structure of world to be simply given, in this case, not to individuals, but,
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rather, to a linguistic community as a whole. According to Sellars, knowledge of the
logical structure of language is sufficient for knowledge of the categorial structure of
the “world” of conceptual contents conferred by that language, but it is not sufficient
for knowledge of the categorial structure of world, as it is in itself. The world, as it
is in itself, is completely independent from our conceptual representation of it, and
there is no guarantee that the world and our conceptual representation of it map onto
one another, not even in their basic structure. If there is to be a mapping between
the world and our conceptual representation of it, this is something we must work
to achieve, and achieving it may require actively transforming our language, right up
to its very logical structure.25 We do not get knowledge of the categorial structure of
world for free just by speaking a language. Knowledge of the world, as it is in itself,
is not that easy. If it was, it wouldn’t be knowledge of the world, as it is in itself.
So, to think of knowledge of the categorial structure of the world as simply given to
a linguistic community who speak a language with a certain logical structure is to
preclude oneself from being able to think of this “knowledge of the world” as genuine
knowledge of the world. I worry that Brandom, despite providing us with the very
resources to make sense of this form of the Myth of the Given, falls prey to it himself.
According to Brandom, the world is the totality of facts, and a fact, for Brandom,
is just a true proposition (1994, 333). So, the world consists in the totality of true
propositions. Now, Brandom understands propositions in terms of their place in what
he calls the “iron triangle of discursiveness,” which consists in the correspondence
between the semantic notion of the proposition, the pragmatic notion of assertion, and
the syntactic notion of the declarative sentence (2008, 117).26 The facts that constitute
the world are identified with the propositions that are true, which is to say, the semantic
contents expressed by the declarative sentences such that, assertorically uttering those
sentences, one takes oneself to be stating facts. So, the constituents of the world, the
facts, are to be understood in terms of the declarative sentences that can be used to
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state them. Now, facts are structured. They consist, for instance, in objects being
propertied and related in various ways (1994, 333). For Brandom, these notions of
objects, properties, and relations are essentially understood in terms of their roles as
constituents of facts, and so they too are to be understood as belonging in the iron
triangle of discursiveness. So, the ontological categories that categorize the facts that
constitute the world are to be understood in terms of the syntactic categories that
categorize the sentences with which those facts are stated. By taking the syntactic
structure of language and the categorial structure of the world to be two sides of the
same coin (or, triangle, as he’d prefer to put it), Brandom falls prey to the Myth of the
Categorially Given.27
It would take us too far afield to mount a substantive independent criticism of Bran-
dom along these lines.28 My aim here is to make it clear where I take the fundamental
difference between Brandom and Sellars to lie. There is a sense in which Sellars agrees
that the world is the totality of propositionally-structured facts. This point might be
better put by saying that Sellars thinks there is a world that is the totality of facts.
The world we conceptually represent in experience, thought, and language, at least in
our current stage of conceptual development, is a world of propositionally-structured
facts, which are about objects that are propertied and related in various ways. Sell-
ars maintains, however, that this world is a world of appearances, and, insofar as it
exists at all, it “exists only in actual and obtainable representings of it,” (1968, 49).
In the world we conceptually represent, there exists properties and facts, which are
represented by the use of predicates and sentences. However, there are no such things
in the world, as it is in itself. What there is, in the world in itself, are actual and
potential representings of properties. These representings are themselves particulars,
which, though sortable, are not in any way general. Talk here of a representing as
being a representing “of” some property, such as the property of being red, is not to
be understood, on the final analysis, as relating the representing to some content that
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is represented (the thing that the representing is a representing“of”). Rather, it is to be
understood as classifying the representing intrinsically as a representing. Saying this,
once again, is just what rejecting the relational theory of meaning and supplanting it
with the functional role theory of meaning entitles us to do. However, Brandom does
not seem to think that this move can be made. I will now make it, demonstrating that
it can be.
5 Responding to the Semantic Challenge
The basic move that Brandom makes that he takes to constitute a reason against
Sellars’s nominalism involves insisting, once again, that Sellars has not adequately
appreciated the distinction between doing and saying. According to Brandom, Sellars
has given an account of what we’re doing with the use of predicates and sentences,
including sentences containing nominalizations of predicates, but he has not given an
account of what we’re saying, and, in endorsing ontological nominalism, he precludes
us from being able to give any such account. Properties, after all, are things that we
say of things, and propositions are things that we say. If we reject the existence of such
things, how are we going to be able to tell a story going about what it is to say that
things are thus and so? Brandom thinks we won’t be. He writes:
I don’t see that we have the makings of a story on the ontological or
the semantic side of what corresponds on the pragmatic side to saying
(claiming, believing) something. If the world is a collection of particulars
[. . . ] what is one doing in saying that things are thus-and-so? How for
Sellars are we to understand either the “thus and so” or the “saying that”?
I am buffaloed, (2015, 270).
Brandom’s worry is that, if the world consists in a bunch of nameables with no sayables,
how could we make sense of what we’re doing in saying that things are thus and so?
What could we possibly be saying? The answer to this question, it seems, could only
be “nothing,” since, on the final picture, there are no things to be said. This is what we
19
might call the “paradox of nominalism”: nominalism seems to entail the paradoxical
conclusion that nothing can be said.
Sellars’s ingenious solution to this paradox is to say that it hinges on a crucial
equivocation between “nothing” and “no thing,” (1979, 41-43).29 Clearly, it would be
absurd to say that, when we say of the tomato that it’s red, we’re saying nothing about
it. Clearly, there’s something we’re saying of the tomato when we say of it that it’s red:
we’re saying of it that it’s red. It’d be absurd to deny that. It is not absurd, however,
to deny that there is some thing that we’re saying of it when we say of it that its red.
The crucial move is to block the inference from “something” to “some thing.” We are
saying something of the tomato when we say of it that it’s red; we’re saying of it that it’s
red. However, “that it’s red,” while surely not meaningless, does not pick out some
thing. Rather than functioning to pick out some thing that we’re saying of the tomato
when we say of it that it’s red, “that it’s red” functions to characterize what we’re doing
in saying of the tomato that it’s red. What are we doing in saying of something that
it’s red? Well, we’re making a particular sort of move in a language game, one that
commits us to saying of the tomato that it’s colored, precludes us from being entitled
to say of it that it’s green, and so on. Surprisingly enough, by spelling out the details
of a functional role semantic theory, Brandom gives us just the account we need for us
to respond to his own worry.
The root of Brandom’s befuddlement here, I think, is his commitment to the Fregean
distinction between content and force. Brandom takes it that when one “says that
things are thus and so” there is a content—that things are thus and so—to which one
attaches a force—asserting it. In other words, there is a distinction between, on the
one hand, content asserted and, on the other hand, the act of asserting that content. If
we endorse a functional role semantics, however, we need not think this way. I don’t
think Brandom should, and I don’t think that Sellars, ultimately, does. On Sellars’s
final view, there are no such things as the contents that p or that q, which are the
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things that are said, when one says that p or says that q. The expressions “that p” and
“that q” are properly understood not as picking out relata of a saying relation, but as
functioning to classify sayings, intrinsically as sayings (1969, 227-228; 1979, 72-73).30 So,
there are just sayings that p and sayings that q. These are two different sorts of doings,
both identifiable as sayings in virtue of playing the role that sayings do in a linguistic
practice in which they are done, and identifiable as distinct sorts of sayings in virtue of
playing distinctive roles of this sort.31 For instance, one’s saying that p might commit
one to a saying that r, whereas one’s saying that q might preclude one from being entitled
to a saying that r. So, Brandom’s development of Sellars’s functional role semantics,
in addition to giving us an account of the appearance of propositional contents, also
enables us to do without them in our conception of the world, as it is in itself, enabling
us to analyze sayings simply as doings, as makings of moves in the game of giving and
asking for reasons. Just as speaking of moves in chess does not require us to speak of
the “contents” of those moves, neither does speaking of moves in the game of giving
and asking for reasons. In this way, Brandom gives us the resources to spell out an
account of “contents” in which, strictly speaking, there are no contents.32
Now, the traditional argument for the distinction between contents asserted and
acts of asserting them is the so-called “Frege/Geach problem.” One canonical version
of this problem involves supposedly showing that, in order to make sense of such
things as the validity of modus ponens, one must appeal to propositional contents
that can be expressed without being asserted.33 Consider the following application of
modus ponens in schematic form:
If p, then q p
q
Intuitively the first premise functions not to assert the proposition p or the proposition
q, but, rather, to assert that a relation obtains between the proposition p and the
proposition q: if the first one is true, then so too is the second. Only in the second
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premise, where “p” shows up unembedded, is p not merely expressed but asserted as
well. Now, the crucial thought is that, in order for the argument to be unequivocally
valid, it must be the same propositional content that gets expressed without being asserted
in the first premise and that gets asserted in the second premise. If that’s so, there
must be, in addition to acts of assertion, propositional contents that are assertable, yet
detachable from the force of assertion. Accordingly, any account that aims to make
sense of assertions simply as acts without appeal to any contents that are asserted, is
mistaken.
If the above argument goes through, then the Sellarsian strategy I’ve just outlined
is hopeless. However, once again, Brandom’s own resources give us another way to
go here. Here, it is logical expressivism that comes to the rescue.34 Once we have
an expressivist account of conditionals, we can give an account of what one is doing
in uttering a sentence of the form “If p, then q” that does not any way commit us to
the claim that “p” and “q” pick out sayables rather than mere doables. What is one
doing in uttering a sentence of the form “If p, then q”? Well, this is going to depend
on the particular sort of logical expressivism that one endorses, but, to give a simple
expressivist theory of conditionals just to see how the basic account is supposed to go,
let us say that what one is doing, in uttering a sentence of the form “If p, then q,” is
expressing an attitude of permissive consequence, licensing the doing of q, upon the
licit doing of p.35 To do this, in general terms, is to license the doing of one on thing
on the basis of the licit doing of another. That itself is a doing, one that can itself be
licensed from other doings, and licensing this doing from some other doing would
be what one would be doing were one to utter a conditional sentence in which this
conditional sentence is embedded as a consequent. In this way, we can think of the two
premises, understood simply as doings of distinctive sorts, as licensing the conclusion.
Of course, this is just one example, meant to show how the general strategy is supposed
to work, and it would have to be worked out in many cases in order to respond to the
22
Frege/Geach problem in its full generality, but there is no reason to think that it can’t
work for the various other cases.36
Of course, Brandom may be inclined to re-raise the initial charge here, saying that
this may well be a fine account of what one is doing in uttering a sentence of the form
“If p, then q,” but we still need an account of what one is saying in doing that. The
response, once again, is that, insofar as we’re speaking of the world, as it is in itself,
there is no thing that is said over and above the thing that is done. Sayings really are
just doings of a certain sort, moves in the game of giving and asking for reasons, and
distinctive sorts of sayings, for instance, conditional sayings, are just moves that play
a distinctive sort of functional role, for instance, functioning to license the making of
some move from the making of some other, but not functioning to make either of these
moves itself. So, strictly speaking, there are no “things that are said” by utterances of
declarative sentences, conditional or otherwise; there are only things that are done. It
is Sellars’s functional role semantics, developed by Brandom, that enables us to say
this, maintaining without paradox that, in doing so, there is no thing we are saying,
just something we are doing, a move we are making.
6 Responding to the Ontological Challenge
So, Sellars can make sense of what we’re doing in “saying that things are thus and so”
without appealing to semantic contents that are said, thus maintaining that the world,
as it is in itself, does not contain any such things as properties or propositions. This,
however, immediately raises the question of how we should characterize the world
as it is in itself, if not in terms of the ontological categories of properties, relations,
and propositionally-structured facts. Sellars is clear, of course, that the world, as he
conceives of it, is fundamentally a world of particulars. The issue that Sellars needs
to address, however, is how to make sense of a world of particulars as an articulated
world, such that we can make sense of our scientific vocabularies, at the various
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levels of description at which science can be done, as correctly describing the world.37
Brandom rightly recognizes the basic Sellarsian strategy:
As far as I can see, Sellars is envisaging a world in which the “ones-in-
many” needed to make sense of an articulated world are such as could be
referred to by common nouns (sortals). That is the alternative to universals
he seems to be working with, (2015, 271).
But Brandom doesn’t see how this strategy can be made to work. Specifically, he
worries that one cannot make sense of the criteria of application of supposedly un-
problematic sortal terms without implicitly or explicitly appealing to problematic
predicate terms, (2015, 271).
To consider Brandom’s worry abstractly, consider a vocabulary with a set of
sortals—S, T, U, and so on—a set of predicate adjectives—F, G, H, and so on—and a
set of names—a, b, c, and so on. Now, the reason that sortals, in addition to names,
are nominalismically acceptable is that every correct use of a sortal expression, there
corresponds a particular, a nameable, that is sorted by that sortal. For instance, if,
pointing at something, I say, “There’s an S,” I am talking about a particular S, the one
I pointed out. But what is it for something to be an S? That is to ask, what are the
criteria for the application of this sortal expression? Brandom takes it that the only
way to articulate these criteria is inferentially, and the only way one could do that is by
deploying adjectival vocabulary; in addition to saying such things as, “If something’s
an S, then it’s a T,” we must say such things as, “If something is an S, then it is F,” “If
something is an S, then if it is not G, then it is H,” and so on. Here, it seems that we
can only articulate the content of the sortal S with the use of the adjectival expressions
F, G, and H, and these are ontologically problematic since they have no criteria of
identity and individuation and so cannot purport to speak of particular things, but
must, rather, express general ways for particular things to be. So, Sellars wants a world
of particulars, but he needs a world of sorted particulars, and we can’t make sense of
the sorts to which these particulars belong without appealing to properties that these
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particulars have, in virtue of which they are to be sorted as they are.
Now, the obvious way to respond to an argument of this sort is to deny that the
content of the sortal S needs to be spelled out with the use of predicative adjectives
and can be spelled out solely with the use of other sortals. It’s hard, however, to
see how this strategy can be made to work. One way to try to cash out what it is
for something to be an S in terms of other sortals is to do so mereologically, saying
something such as, for something to be an S is for it to be composed of a certain
number of Ts. However, this strategy is surely hopeless. Being a lion, for instance,
surely cannot be identified with being mereological sum of parts of a certain sort. Let
me give three reasons why. First, while one could account for some of the statements
articulative of the content of “lion” in this way, such as “Lions have four legs,” the vast
majority of the statements we make about lions, such as “Lions are tawny,” “Lions are
carnivorous,” and so on, seem to resist any sort of mereological analysis. Second, to
make matters worse, a mereological account of the criteria of application of the term
“Lion” is incompatible with the criteria of identity and individuation. Something’s
being the same lion through some period of time is compatible with its changing its
parts, through consumption and excretion, through that period of time. Finally, as
if more was needed, the most basic reason a mereological account of the criteria of
application of a sortal is not going to work is that it cannot be applied at the base level.
If our account of what it is for something to be the sort of thing it is requires us to appeal
to the things that compose it, then, if and when we reach a level of basic uncomposed
things, elementary particles, say, we’re not going to be able to apply our account to
make sense of their being of different sorts. It is on the basis of considerations like
these, I take it, that Brandom thinks that one is ultimately going to have to appeal to
properties in making sense of the criteria of application of sortal terms.
Insofar as we think of the world as a world of things or objects, it’s hard to see what
the strategy for the Sellarsian ontological nominalist could be other than the mereo-
25
logical one, and, in that case, it’s quite clear that it’s not going to work.38 However,
Sellars’s final version of nominalism, not developed until very late in his career and
still only rather sketchily at that, provides a crucial response to this worry: the partic-
ulars that fundamentally constitute the world are not, in the first instance, particular
things (objects), but, rather, particular happenings (processes, events, or activities). It is
this final ontological framework that enables us to respond to Brandom’s ontological
challenge.39 I’ve been implicitly working in this framework here, but let me now lay
it out explicitly. Happenings, on Sellars’s conception of them, are particulars through
and through. They’re sortable, but their sortability not mediated by their instantiation
of general properties. So, there may be one φ-ing at one time and place and another,
distinct, φ-ing at a different time and place. Here, the thought is, we have two particu-
larφ-ings, both classifiable as such in virtue of what they do—the difference they make
in a world of other happenings. We may say, for instance, that a φ-ing at a particular
time and place excludes a ψ-ing at that time and place, necessitates a χ-ing at some
other time and place, and so on.40 The world, according to Sellars’s final ontological
picture, is a world of such happenings, which, though particulars, regularly unfold in
certain patterns, and so are classifiable as happenings of different sorts.
I have been implicitly appealing to this ontological picture in order to speak of our
own discursive acts, specifically, our own languagings, abstractly characterizable as
saying that ps or saying that qs. According to the analysis proposed in the previous
section, such acts are ultimately identified simply in terms of what it is to do them, in
terms of their role in a linguistic practice, and so characterizable intrinsically as sayings
of distinctive sorts without any appeal to distinctive propositional contents that are
“said.” The act of saying that p, on this account, is characterized simply a doing of a
certain sort, identified in terms of the difference it makes among other linguistic doings,
precluding or mandating them. Accordingly, one only needs to speak of particular
saying that ps, characterized in terms of their linguistic roles, without needing to speak
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of any abstract propositional content picked out by the phrase “that p” or some abstract
relation that one stands to that propositional content that is “said.” These sayings, on
this conception, are simply happenings of a certain variety, identified in terms of
their role among happenings of the same variety, excluding or necessitating them,
where these happenings are conceived from within the practice as doings governed by
normative relations of preclusive and committive consequence. Discursive beings such
as ourselves can be identified as loci of happenings of this variety. So, to respond to
Brandom’s challenge with an example near and dear to Brandom’s heart, the criteria of
application for the sortal term “discursive being” to us, conceived of as those who say
“We,” can be articulated directly in terms of the patterns of happenings, specifically
languagings, intelligible only as norm-governed doings, that unfold whenever you
have one of us.41
Consider now the example of something in the world, external to ourselves and
our own acts, to which we might apply this ontological picture, a particular lion, say.
According to this picture, something’s being a lion is not its instantiating the general
kind lionhood. Rather, it is its doing what lions do, being the locus of the patterns of
processes that unfold in the world whenever you have a lion. So, to be a lion is to eat
gazelles, to bear live young, to reflect light with a certain frequency, and so on. In this
context, the criteria for the application of the sortal term “lion” to some particular lion,
conceived of in terms of the pattern of processes that unfolds whenever you have a
lion, can be articulated directly in terms of these processes. Sentences that articulate
the conceptual content of the expression “lion” such as “Lions are tawny,” “Lions are
carnivorous,” “Lions have four legs,” and so on, can be reconceived, according to this
final ontological picture, as functioning to regiment the language such that the patterns
of the use of these expressions track the patterns of processes that unfold whenever
you have a lion. Speaking of the color of lions with the use of •tawny•s tracks a
certain pattern of processes that unfolds whenever you have a lion, speaking of the
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eating habits of lions with •carnivorous•s tracks a different one, and so on.42 This
notion of linguistic items “tracking” of certain patterns in the world is understood
in terms of the fact that the patterns of languagings correspond as a whole to the
patterns of happenings in the world, necessitating and excluding one another as the
corresponding happenings in the world do with respect to one another. With this
holistic correspondence in view, we can speak of language “picturing” the world.
In Rorty’s (1997) introduction to Sellars’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,
he describes “Sellars’s attempt to revive the ‘picturing’ relation,” as an “accidental
accretion,” wisely stripped off in Brandom’s “cultivation” of Sellars’s view, (8). We can
now see that, far from being an “accidental accretion,” Sellars’s revival of the picturing
relation is an absolutely necessary feature of his overall philosophical picture, for
it is precisely the revival of this notion that enables him to maintain the notion of
representational adequacy in a conception of the world consisting solely of concrete
particulars. Picturing is the notion of representational adequacy belonging to the
final ontological picture, contrasting with the conception of representational adequacy,
endorsed by Brandom (1994) and famously championed by John McDowell (1994),
according to which representational adequacy is identity between representing and
represented.43 For Sellars, this McDowellian conception of representational adequacy
is correct just insofar as we limit ourselves to the “world” of conceptual contents,
which consists in propositionally-structured facts which may be identical to the very
propositions that we take to be the case. As we’ve articulated above, however, this
“world,” a “shadow” cast by a linguistic practice with a certain structure, is crucially
distinct from the real world to which the linguistic practices casting the shadow of
that world belong. In order to speak of representational adequacy of a language with
respect to the real world, on this final ontological picture, we need picturing. The
aim of scientific inquiry is for the patterns of our scientific languagings to picture the
patterns of the happenings in the world that we mean to be describing with the use of
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our scientific vocabulary.44 Modal vocabulary, deployed in the statement of the laws of
the scientific image, which articulates the conceptual contents expressed by the terms
of scientific vocabulary, is understood, on the final picture, as functioning to regiment
the language so that it comes to picture the world. It is only through the language’s
becoming well-regimented through hard scientific work that it is possible to grasp the
structure of the world, as it is in itself, by grasping the structure of a language that
pictures it.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have focused on Brandom’s criticisms of Sellars’s nominalist picture,
arguing that Sellars not only has the resources to respond to these criticisms, but that
the key Sellarsian ideas that figure in these responses are the very ones that Brandom
develops in his own work. It is perhaps worth saying, in closing, why I have not
considered criticisms of Sellars’s view that have arisen within the context of discussions
of platonism vs. nominalism in contemporary metaphysics. The main reason for this is
that there essentially are no such criticisms. Sellars’s name is occassionally mentioned
in contemporary discussions of platonism vs. nominalism, but a view of the form
actually put forward by Sellars is not recognized as a possibility in these debates.
Contemporary portrayals of nominalism, widely influenced by the work of Armstrong
(1980, 1989), often regard “predicate nominalism” or “concept nominalism” as possible
views that one might have according to which there are really no properties.45 Though
Sellars’s own brand of nominalism could be described as a sophisticated version of both
“predicate” and “concept” nominalism, what it means to use these terms in application
to his view can only be appreciated once his philosophical system is on the table, and
nothing like his system is ever considered in contemporary discussions of “predicate”
and “concept” nominalism. Brandom at least attempts to come to terms with the key
elements that distinguish Sellars’s form of nominalism. However, as I have argued
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here, even he fails to get the full picture into view. Once we do have the full picture in
view, we can draw a surprising conclusion about the relationship between the work of
Brandom and the work of Sellars, one that does bear, albeit indirectly, on contemporary
discussions.
Brandom describes his work as ”post-Sellarsian.”46 However, Sellars’ nominal-
ist picture of the world, as I’ve articulated it, actually contains Brandom’s idealist
picture of the world as a world of conceptual contents, as a proper part. Sellars’s
nominalism therefore goes beyond Brandom’s form of idealism in locating it as one
aspect of a larger “two worlds” picture of reality. Accordingly, it can be described as
“post-Brandomian.”47 Highlighting the respect in which Sellars may be said to be a
post-Brandomian helps to bring out the contemporary relevance of of his work if one
considers the way in which the vast majority of contemporary philosophy can, ar-
guably, be described as “pre-Brandomian.” Brandom’s account of conceptual content
goes beyond the psychological platonist picture that is endorsed by the vast majority
of contemporary philosophers of mind and language, avoiding the form of the Myth
of the Given to which these philosophers fall prey. Most contemporary philosophers
of mind and language take properties and relations to be mind-independent abstract
entities that can be appealed to in the context of a theory of linguistic competence.48
As explicated above, this, according to Sellars, implicates them in a form of the Myth
of the Given. Though, as I’ve argued here, Brandom fails to fully extricate himself
from the Myth, he does overcome this form of the Myth. So, analytic philosophy must
make it into its Brandomian stage before it can enter into its Sellarsian one. That, of
course, is a very bold claim, and it would go well beyond the scope of this paper to
systematically substantiate it.49 Still, I hope I have said enough here to demonstrate
the contemporary philosophical relevance of Sellars’s nominalistic picture.50
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Notes
1By calling the dubbing of this view “nominalism” idosyncratic, I mean specifically with respect to
contemporary uses. It’s not particularly idosyncratic with respect to the original, medieval use of the
term.
2I focus on Brandom here because of his philosophical stature and critical engagement with Sellars,
but it’s worth noting that even the most close and careful interpreters of Sellars’s work tend to downplay
the extent to which Sellars’s nominalism really does involve a commitment to ontological nominalism.
Willem deVries (2011), for instance, writes
Sellars often described his realistic naturalism as ‘nominalistic,’ but the point is not so much
to deny that there are abstracta as to tell us what language that uses abstract singular terms
is doing for us and how differently it functions from language using concrete singular
terms.
On the account I’m articulating here, it is a crucial feature of Sellars’s realistic naturalism that there
really are no such things as abstracta, and much of the point of telling us how abstracta-talk functions
differently than genuine descriptive talk is to entitle us to this claim. A notable exception to this trend is
Joanna Seibt (1990, 2000), puts Sellars’s ontological nominalism front and center. Much of Seibt’s work
is congenial to what I am doing here, though the overarching “two worlds” picture developed here, in
which I frame Sellars’s nominalism, is not to be found in Seibt’s reconstruction.
3In what follows I will think of propositions as entities which represent objects as instantiating
properties or standing in relations, bracketing the question of whether of what an alternate notion of
proposition or fact that does not depend on properties or relations could be.
4Unlike that of, say, Armstong or Lewis. Cowling’s (2016) recent book on abstract entities, for instance,
contains no reference to Sellars, and neither does Rodriguez-Pereyra’s (2015) Stanford Encyclopedia
article on nominalism in metaphysics.
5Sellars makes this claim, specifically, about the categorial structure of the world. The idea that the
metaphysical structure of the world imposes itself on the mind in this way is presumably a less basic
form of the Myth, but the two, in this case, go hand in hand.
6This way of speaking of the Myth of the Given is quite different than what you’ll get in most
commentators, who take the Myth of the Given to be something much more specific, involving the idea
that non-conceptual awareness could serve as a rational basis for our conceptual judgments (deVries
2011; Bonevac 2007, deVries and Triplett 2000, xxv-xxvi; Brandom 1997, McDowell 1994). On the reading
developed here, such an idea is an instance of the Myth, but just because it implicitly involves the idea
that knowledge of the structure of experienced reality, as grasped through a conceptual understanding
of that reality, is simply given. The reading here is closer to and owes some influence to that proposed by
Williams (2009), according to which the “Myth of the Given in its general form [just is] epistemological
foundationalism in its general form,” (154). Kremer (M.S.) also proposes a reading along these lines.
7Thus, I take it that the core thought underlying the rejection of the Myth of the Given is expressed
in Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind when Sellars tells us, “empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated
extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise
which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once,” (1956).
8Though what we have knowledge of, in having this knowledge, is not what we pre-theoretically take
it to be.
9That Sellars’s basic picture, in which his ontological nominalism is to be placed, is a Platonic one,
while it might seem strange, not at all surprising. Sellars describes himself (in a rather different context)
as a “a card-carrying member of the Platonic tradition,” going on to say “Plato wrong is usually closer to
the truth than other philosophers right,” (1971, 8).
10A brief discussion of such theories of meaning occurs in Part 6 of Empiricism and the Philosophy of
Mind. More sustained discussions can be found in Sellars (1979).
11Some version of this Augustinian conception of meaning is assumed by the vast majority of contem-
porary semantic theorists, as will be evident from a survey of any of the more philosophically-oriented
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introductory semantics textbooks used today. For explicit defense of this conception, in connection with
these contemporary semantic theories, see King (2018).
12In both of these cases, we may suppose that the special use is achieved by italicizing the word “red.”
13Now, as Conant (2020, 864-947) makes clear, something’s being a “rot” cannot be understood as its
being a “mere mark” of a certain shape. Rather, it must be understood as a mark that is in principle
capable playing the role that “rot”s do in the practice of using the German language: that is, something’s
being a “rot” cannot be understood apart from its, at least potentially, being a •red•.
14I am here simplifying the presentation in “Abstract Entities” by modifying the grammar of regularly
quoted expressions to use them as common nouns, rather than following Sellars (1963a, 49) in introducing
an additional notional convention—asterisk quotes—which function by explicit convention to form
common nouns.
15It follows from this convention that the English sentence “The word ‘red’ means red” is analytically
true, in the sense that it is true by linguistic convention. Essentially, what one is saying in saying this is
just that “red”s function as “red”s do, which is, of course, trivially true.
16In saying that making the move one makes in uttering “a is red” commits one to making the move
one makes in uttering “a is colored” (or, once dot-quoting is introduced, that uttering a •a is red• commits
one to uttering an •a is colored•), what I mean is that, in making the first move, one is committed to
making the second move in the sense that if prompted one will have to make it. In other words, if one
makes the first move and one refuses to make the second move if prompted, one will be in violation of
the norms. See Simonelli (2020, 4-5) for a defense of this way of putting things.
17Moreover, we should note norms relating •red•s to non-color predicates, such as that commitment
to a •ripe•(x) and •tomato•(x) commits one to an •red•(x), and so on. So, in order for German “rot”s
and English “red”s to both be •red• there must be more than other color terms in the language—there
must be such terms as “tomatoes,” “roses,” and so on. There need not be a complete coincidence in these
terms (for it could be that German speakers know nothing of tomatoes), but there must be at least some
substantial overlap. I leave aside, for the purpose of simplicity here, the difficult question of how to work
into the functional role semantics what Sellars (1954, 1979) calls “language-entry” and “language-exit”
transitions.
18If we are being careful, we should quantify not just over any language actually containing •red•s and
•green•s, but, rather, over any language into which •red•s and •green•s can be introduced (See Sellars 1979,
7-8 for a gesture at such a strategy). This modal qualifier is needed to respond to the worry, expressed
by Himmelright (2020), that “Sellars’ system cannot adequately handle cases where there are important
properties without any corresponding inscriptions,” (5).
19Thus, Sellars says, “Only as a last resort would I consent to expunge discourse about attributes from
my vocabulary,” (1979, 6). It’s worth being clear, however, that this statement still implicitly contains the
claim that it’s possible to drop talk of properties, since Sellars is saying that this is what he would do, in
some circumstances, as a last resort.
20This is not to say, of course, that (2) is not true. On Sellars’s (1968) account, (2) is indeed true, which
is to say that it is semantically assertable, given the rules of the language to which it belongs, (86-101).
It’s just not true in virtue of expressing a true proposition (once again, because there is no such thing).
21Genuine realism about this world, taking it to be ontologically on par with the world of objects that
we are capable of bumping into would, for Sellars, amount to the “fallacy” of “projecting the rules of
[our] language into the non-linguistic world,” (1949).
22One might think that this is a sort of slip by Sellars, not expressive of his official view on the identity
of properties. In “Abstract Entities,” he says that properties are not identical to functional roles of
predicates but, rather, are the functionally-characterized predicates themselves. In developing this claim,
he reconstructs “the property of being red” as “the •red•,” and so “the property of being red” is analyzed,
not as a name, but as a distributive singular term, distributing over all the •red•s. This is, surely, a
different analysis than one according to which properties are identical to functional roles, but it does not
seem any better, and, moreover, the fact that Sellars equivocates here illustrates that he does not have a
clear conception of exactly what identity claim he should make.
23If one looks at this part through the lens of Brandom’s (1997) study guide, one will think that there’s
nothing especially new here. According to Brandom, the basic point of Part 7 of EPM is that one could
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not possess anything of epistemic significance independently of the possession of concepts, which is the
same point that Brandom takes Sellars to be making in the opening sections of EPM where he discusses
the classical sense datum theory. Brandom downplays Sellars’s use of the term “structured logical space”
here, saying “Sellars says ‘logical’ but that is just 1950s talk for ‘conceptual,’ which for Sellars can be
parsed as ‘inferential,”’ (151). On my reading, there is a crucial distinction marked by the use of the term
“logical” there—Sellars’s concern at this point in EPM is not simply conceptual structure but specifically
the structure of categorial concepts.
24This idea is spelled out in Sellars’s (1963b, 1974) proposal, following Carnap, that abstract categories
like properties and propositions can be introduced on the basis of analytic sentences that schematize
over all the elements of a certain syntactic categories, such as “For all p, p or not-p” or “For all x and
F, x is F or x is not F.” Such sentences can be understood as making explicit the functional role of an
expression just insofar as it belongs to the syntactic category sentence or adjectival predicate. Introducing
abstract ontological categories on the basis of these sentences is a way of reifying these roles so as to be
able to say what such sentences merely show. See Brandt (2007, 114-122) for a detailed discussion of how
this Carnpian strategy figures in Sellars’s thinking.
25One might wonder, given the Carnapian proposal mentioned in the previous note, whether the
revisability of the basic ontological categories would require the revisability analytic sentences such as
“For all x and F, x is F or x is not F,” something which seems to be implausible. The crucial thing to
note here is that the schematic letters in such tautologies range over expressions of distinctive syntactic
types, and it is the very syntactic categorization of the language that is potentially subject to revision. For
properties, the relevant syntactic category is adjectival predicates, schematically represented by the letter
“F” in the tautology just stated. Insofar as the language contains adjectival predicates, such sentences will
be analytic truths—indeed, their being such is partly constitutive of there being adjectival predicates in
the language. However, what is open for potential revision is the language’s containing of any adjectival
predicates at all. If the language were modified in such a way that nothing played this syntactic role, as
I will claim it could in principle be in the final section of this paper, it would not contain the tautologies
on the basis of which the category of properties could be introduced. Of course, a language could not
do without sentential expressions, but note once again that I am thinking of the abstract category of
propositions as representing objects as instantiating properties or standing in relations, and so the set of
sentences on the basis of which this particular notion of proposition could be introduced will also include
sentences involving such schematic letters as F and R.
26It’s to the point here that Brandom calls it the “iron” triangle. The metaphor, I take it, is supposed
to suggest the sense of immutability—that, whatever else may change, the nexus of correlated notions
that constitute the triangle cannot be shaken. By Sellars’s lights, I take it, Brandom’s taking there to be
this sort of immutability in the core categorial semantic/pramgiatc/syntactic notions is precisely what
constitutes his falling prey to the Myth of the Given. Running with the metaphor, the Sellarsian response
would be to point out that even iron melts at a high enough temperature.
27One might think that Brandom has discharged the accusation of the Myth in virtue of having offered,
in Chapter Six of Making It Explicit, a “transcendental deduction” of the logical structure of our language,
showing that any language capable of conferring conceptual content must be syntactically categorized
in the way that ours is. However, once we are a bit more careful about precisely what the correlation
between syntactic categories and ontological ones is, we see that, even if Brandom’s deduction works
(which is a big “if”), it does not warrant an inference to the transcendental necessity of thinking of the
world in terms of an object-property structure. In his writings on abstract entities, Sellars speaks of
“predicates” as the linguistic correspondents of properties, but it is really specifically adjectival predicates
of which he is speaking. In order for the object-property structure to be derived, rather than simply the
object-kind structure, which Sellars ultimately accepts in some form, it must be specifically the use of
adjectival predicates that are derived, and Brandom never produces such a derivation.
28Doing so would require demonstrating not only that the thin notion of objectivity that is developed
in Making It Explicit is insufficient, but so too is the much thicker notion of objectivity developed by
Brandom’s Hegel in A Spirit of Trust. That is a much larger task than can be undertaken here. Still, in this
regard, it’s worth noting that, by Sellars’s lights, even Hegel, “that great foe of ‘immediacy”’ (1956, 14)
was not altogether innocent of the Myth.
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29In Naturalism and Ontology, as in several other places, the discussion of this solution is tied up with
the presentation of Jumbalese, a fictional language in which there are no predicates and predication is
achieved by writing singular terms in certain styles. The introduction of this fictional language is meant
to show how we can think of predicates of English as auxiliary signs which function, as styles of writing
do in Jumbalese, to directly classify the particulars picked out by singular terms, rather than thinking
of the classifying role of predicates as mediated through the predicate’s expression of some thing—a
property—that is predicated of the particular in the sentence to which the predicate the singular term
belong. I try to present the basic ideas here without the detour into a discussion of Jumbalese, as I think
this detour would obscure the basic point here.
30Hence, an expression of the form “that p” is construed “as a special sort of adverb” (1969, 227). While
the most explicit expressions of this view are the passages in “Metaphysics and the Concept of Person”
and Naturalism and Ontology, just cited, an illuminating antecedent expression of this view can be found
in “Being and Being Known,” where Sellars characterizes as “radically mistaken” views according to
which different intellectual acts “differ not in their intrinsic character as acts but by virtue of being related
to different relata. Thus, the thought of X differs from the thought of Y not qua act of thought, but qua
related to X as opposed to Y,” (1960, 41). Though the point is framed for thought here, the same point
can be made for assertion. It’s radically mistaken to think that the difference between the act of asserting
that p and the act of asserting that q is one in which these two linguistic acts “differ not in their intrinsic
character as acts, but by virtue of being directly related to different relata,” two different contents, that p
and that q. On the Sellarsian alternative, the way in which the assertion that p differs from the assertion
that q is its intrinsic character, where the intrinsic character of an act of assertion is understood in terms
of its role in linguistic practice.
31For a further spelling out just how to identify a doing as a saying in virtue of its playing a distinctive
sort of discursive role, see Brandom (1994, 141-198); for a summary of that account, see Wanderer (2008,
51-57).
32In recent years, several theorists, most notably Hanks (2011, 2015) and Soames (2014, 2015), have
proposed “act-based” accounts of propositions, according to which propositions are act types, specifically,
types of predicational acts. I am here classifying Sellars’s conception of propositional content as an act-
based account, but one that is distinct from contemporary act-based accounts in two crucial ways. First,
contemporary act-based accounts conceptualize the act-types with which propositions are identified as
properties that particular act tokens may instantiate. By contrast, on Sellars’s account, there are only
particulars acts, classifiable as different sorts of acts in accord with the way of thinking laid out in
the following section. Second, contemporary act-based accounts take properties and relations that are
predicated of objects in the acts with which propositions are identified to be abstract entities that aren’t
themselves acts. On the account offered here, by contrast, properties and relations are analyzed in terms
of acts just as propositions are.
33There are really two versions of the Frege/Geach problem, corresponding to two papers of Geach in
which he raises the Frege point. In “Ascriptivism” (Geach, 1960), he raises the problem specifically for
expressivist theories of moral discourse, according to which what one’s doing in saying that something
is bad, for instance, is simply condemning it, rather than force-neutrally predicating badness of it. This
incarnation of the Frege/Geach problem might be thought as an instance of the more general point,
articulated in “Assertion” (Geach, 1965), that any theory of assertion that does not make a distinction
between the content asserted and the force of asserting that content is hopeless. It is this latter, more
general version of the problem that I consider here.
34The term “logical expressivm” is not completely univocal, even in a Brandomian context. Hlobil
(2017), for instance, glosses logical expressivism as the thesis that logical vocabulary, when introduced to a
language that does not contain logical vocabulary, but where sentences stand in relations of consequence
and sets of sentences have the property of incoherence, “allows us to make explicit this consequence
relation and incoherence property within the object language,” (3). So construed, logical expressivism
would be of little help to ontological nominalism, which claims that are no relations or properties. As I
am construing it here, logical expressivism shares a closer kinship to metaethical expressivism, where it
is not facts consisting in things standing in relations or having properties that are expressed by the use
of logical vocabulary, but, rather, normative attitudes, which are not themselves propositional in form.
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For an explication and defense of a conception of logical expressivism more along the lines of the one I
am suggesting here, see Shapiro (2018).
35Brandom (1994, 2001, 2008) distinguishes multiple normative attitudes that conditional locutions
might plausibly be thought of as expressing. Most notably, there is the distinction between attitudes
of permissive consequence, according to which entitlement is attributed to the consequent, given the
attribution commitment and entitlement to the antecedent, and the attitude of committive consequence,
according to which commitment is attributed to the consequent, given the attribution of commitment to
the antecedent. A fully developed logical expressivism is going to need to comprehend the relation
between these consequence relations and the conditional locutions deployed to express them.
36One would need to provide a similar act-based analysis of disjunctive sentences, negative sentences,
quantified sentences, and so on. For fuller carrying-out of general strategy with respect to these other
logical expressions, see Simonelli (M.S.). Another place in which the force/content distinction has been
proposed as necessary is in drawing the distinction between declarative speech acts and interrogitve
speech acts, which are presumed, in the Fregean paradigm, to have the same content but distinct force
(assertoric vs. interrogative). For a pragmatic analysis of the distinctive role of interrogative speech acts
compatible with the nominalist strategy explicated here, see Milson (2014).
37It’s worth being clear that this is an issue that arises solely with respect to the scientific image,
since the manifest image is not a world consisting solely of particulars. In addition to particulars, the
manifest image contains general properties and relations. The account of these denizens of the manifest
image, recall, was given in Section Three. In this regard, it’s important to be clear that, though Sellars’s
nominalist analysis of property-talk applies to the vocabulary of the manifest image, explaining utterances
of sentences like “The property of being red is incompatible with the property of being green” as covert
expressions of the rules governing the use of predicates, the ontology of the manifest image is not a
nominalistic one; it is a platonistic one. So, there is no need to respond to this issue for the manifest
image, since the particulars belonging to the ontology manifest image can be understood as being the
sorts of things that they are in virtue of instantiating the general properties that they do.
38It seems that something like this strategy was tried out in one of Sellars’s early paper, “On the Logic
of Complex Particulars” (1949b). On the analysis proposed there “Fido is angry” is analysed as saying
that there is a complex particular of which both Fido and anger are ingredients, (320-321). It’s hard to
see, however, what the “ingredient” relation he appeals to could be, other than some sort of mereological
one. And even if something more can be said about the ingredient relation, the analysis bottoms out
in primitive classificatory statements, which classify primitive particulars as being of certain primitive
sorts, so we still have the basic problem with any mereological account regarding the sortability of the
primitive particulars.
39Though the process ontology is not explicitly theorized until the Carus Lectures (1981), the seeds of the
conception are present much earlier. For instance, in Science and Metaphysics, Sellars refers to the “natural
order” as “the world of ‘process’ or ‘becoming’,” (1968, 130). Earlier than that, in “Counterfactuals,
Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities,” Sellars mentions that “the conception of the world as pure
process” can be regarded as a “regulative ideal” of scientific inquiry, though says very little about how
the world could be so-conceived, noting that “science has not yet achieved the very concepts in terms
of which such a picture might be formulated,” (1958). Achieving those concepts, I take it, is one of the
main tasks of the Carus Lecutures. Note also that, in the Carus Lectures, the main motivation that Sellars
expresses for his final ontological picture is his proposed solution to what he calls the “sensorium-body”
problem, (1981c, 66). I’m bracketing that motivation here, taking it that the way in which the process
ontology enables his nominalism is motivation enough. See also Seibt (2000) for a similar bracketing of
this motivation.
40A proper discussion of the notions of space and time, though it would be necessary to fully spell
out this nominalist picture, would require getting into aspects of Sellars’s Kantianism that would take us
well beyond the (already very broad) scope of this paper.
41The fact that our languagings can only be understood in normative terms, as emphasized by Brandom
(1994, 623-650), is compatible with Sellars’s non-reductive emergence materialism. According to Sellars,
there is an explanatory direction in science, with higher-level patterns emerging out of lower level
patterns, where, though the rules governing the use of vocabulary deployed to articulate the higher-
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level patterns cannot be logically reduced to the rules governing the use of the vocabulary deployed
to articulate the lower-level patterns, but the higher-level vocabulary’s coming to be applicable can
nevertheless be causally explained through the deployment of the lower-level vocabulary (See O’Shea
2007; 2009, 176-190). Sellars never got completely clear on how to think about the important transitions
from lower-level patterns to higher-level patterns. However, one need not be clear on exactly how the
details go in order to say that there is some series of transitions through which the world progressed
from a world describable solely in the vocabulary of fundamental physics to a world describable in
the normative terms in which we describe ourselves. The universe articulated by fundamental physics,
comprehended as a universe of pure processes which unfold in accord with the laws of fundamental
physics, constitutes the basic level of happenings out of which all the higher-level patterns of happenings,
such as ourselves and our languagings, emerge.
42It’s worth being clear that, according to Sellars, in our final scientific vocabulary, we’re going to drop
use of •tawny•s to speak of the colors of things, since, ultimately, colors are going to be relocated from
things in the world to states of ourselves. Really, what is being pictured by the use of color vocabulary
is not happenings in the world, but, rather, happenings in our head, specifically, sensory states that
systematically necessitate and exclude one another in a way corresponding to the norms of committive
and preclusive consequence governing the use of color terms.
43See also Hornsby (1997), who terms this conception “the identity theory of truth.” Brandom’s (2019)
later development of the McDowellian identity theory is articulated in terms of his “bi-modal conceptual
hylomorphism.”
44It’s worth noting that, for Sellars, all empirically meaningful vocabularies, not just the vocabulary of
our final scientific theory, will picture certain features of the world. The picturing of natural languages,
however, is limited to features of to structural features of the world corresponding to manifest image
concepts and does not picture the reality that accounts for those features. More importantly, though
picturing happens with the use of manifest image vocabulary, it is not the criterion for the correct use of
that vocabulary. This fundamentally contrasts with a self-consciously nominalistic final scientific image,
where we conceive of our scientific languagings as correct insofar as they picture the happenings about
which we’re theorizing.
45For instance, van Cleve (1994, 577-578), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015).
46Brandom explicitly embraces a remark of Rorty’s (1997) which likens the dialectical placement of
Sellars and Brandom to the dialectical placement of Kant and Hegel, the analogy being that, whereas
Sellars’s project was an “attempt to usher analytic philosophy from out of its Humean and into it’s
Kantian stage” (3), Brandom work can be seen as “an attempt to usher analytic philosophy from its
Kantian to its Hegelian stage,” (8-9).
47“post” here, of course, does not indicate temporal posteriority but, rather, dialectical posteriority, in
the way that Brandom (2013) describes Hegel, for instance, as “post-Davidsonian.”
48Once again, for an explicit statement of this theoretical orientation, see King (2018).
49That is something I have aimed to do elsewhere. See Simonelli (M.S.).
50This paper started out as something I was writing while I was sitting in on Bob Brandom’s Sellars
course when I was a visiting scholar at Pittsburgh. I am extremely grateful for Bob’s helpful feedback
at multiple stages in the process and for his enthusiasim and encouragement in my attempt to spell out
a picture according to which he’s on the wrong side of a fundamental philosophical dispute. I’ve also
benefited from extensive conversations on these topics with Jim Conant, as well as helpful comments
from Michael Kremer, Robert Kraut, Bill deVries, Jim O’Shea, Luz C. Seiberth, Lionel Shapiro, Michael
Hicks, Preston Stovall, and an anonymous referee of this journal. Most of all, my thinking about Sellars
has been shaped by many many conversations with Lawrence Dallman, who is at least as responsible for
the overarching conception of Sellars’s picture expressed here as I am myself.
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